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Abstract: In the present paper we propose that in states with relatively weak central 
authorities, decision makers had to develop market oriented organisation solutions to 
successfully face a grave external threat, and these solutions proved to be efficient. 
Using an interdisciplinary approach that combines institutional theory, history and 
strategy, we analyse a case study, the use of corsairs (privateers) by England and the 
United Provinces (Dutch Republic) in the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 centuries. We have 
found that the development of partnership companies went hand in hand for 
commercial and military purposes. English and Dutch privateers proved to be 
economically efficient and superior to the centrally planned war operations of the 
Spanish empire. 
 





 century England and United Provinces (Dutch 
Republic). 
 
JEL Codes: H7, N23, N40, N43, P16. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
              At the beginning of the 16
th
 century, Spain started developing into the 
strongest European state, and establishing the world's biggest overseas and maritime 
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empire, including many parts of today's Central and Latin America (by subduing the 
Indian Aztec, Inca and Maya empires and additionally islands such as Cuba and 
Puerto Rico and parts of Chile) and areas such as Florida, California, and today's 
Philippines and Benelux countries. 
             By the beginning of the next century, the Spanish empire was in decline, 
having faced four bankruptcies during the long reign of Philip II, (died in 1598) the 
loss of its naval supremacy, loss of today’s Netherlands which became de facto 
independent during the Dutch revolt 1568-1648 and de jure in 1648 with the treaties 
of Westphalia and Muenster, and having been humiliated in a series of naval defeats 
at the hands of the then new, poor and “upstart” countries of England and the United 
Provinces (Dutch Republic). It was a historical case of two Davids beating a Goliath.            
How did this happen? 
               Many explanations for the decline of Spain have been offered, as for 
example by North (1981) and Kennedy (1988). Kennedy proposed that the Spanish 
empire during Philip's reign undertook too many wars at the same time: fighting the 
Turks in the Mediterranean, supporting their Habsburg cousins, the emperors of the 
“Holy Roman Empire of the German nation” against revolted (mainly protestant) 
princes and regions, the revolted Dutch and furthermore campaigning against England 
in 1588 with the so-called “Armada”), leading thus to overextension and military and 
financial exhaustion. 
               North points out the wrong and short-sighted economic measures that were 
adopted by Philip in order to face urgent short-term financial problems, which led to a 
“wrong” institutional set up in Spain, which inhibited long-term economic growth. 
One such example is the “mesta”, the union of Spanish owners flocks of sheep that 
produced wool. Philip taxed them in a per head (of animals) tax, which was easy to 
levy, and gave them, in exchange, permission to graze their flocks freely, e.g. 
prohibited enclosure. But non-enclosure meant that agriculture suffered in general, 
because it made investment in land improvisation non profitable. 
              Following an institutional approach, we develop the thesis, that in countries 
with relatively weak central government, such as the United Provinces (Dutch 
Republic) and England in the 16
th
 century (as opposed to Spain which had a relatively 
strong central government), market solutions were introduced, tried and adapted to 
face various problems, and these solutions proved in the long-run superior to centrally 
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imposed solutions. Market solutions brought about an efficient institutional set up that 
was favorable to growth. 
              In previous papers, we have analysed this in explaining the emergence of 
market institutions for long term trade, especially, the spices trade. Central to this, we 
have analysed the emergence of joint-stock companies and stock exchanges (Halkos 
and Kyriazis 2005; Kyriazis 2006; Kyriazis and Metaxas 2010, 2011).                                                                      
             In the present paper, we analyse a related institutional issue, war for profit, 
e.g. how England and the UP, countries with weaker central governments, developed 
market solutions, e.g. corsairs (privateers) and their associated strategy and 
institutional set up, to wage war successfully against Spain and, after Spain took over 
Portugal in 1580, against Portugal too. The two newer naval and maritime nations 
challenged successfully the two older maritime empires. 
            Related to the institutional developments, we analyse the new set of values 
that were linked to them, as efficient cooperation and coordination mechanisms. More 
specifically, these particular values and norms that emerged in the maritime sector 
were trust and self-reliance (both among the cooperating merchants, their officers and 
crews, who in the case of privateering enterprises had a share in profit and thus a 
common purpose), self-confidence (achieved through repeated successful enterprises), 
but also a first sense of cohesion, common mind, fairness and equality, even strong 
religious beliefs (perhaps a protestant ethic according to Weber) , and even, in many 
cases, friendship and a sense of responsibility. 
           These values were essential for attracting and retaining crews for the 
privateering enterprises because they were mostly dangerous voyages, too risky to 
undertake. Thus, these new norms and values especially trust, reduced transaction 
costs, and in this way helped also promote economic development. 
             Such a set of norms and values promotes also a community of interests. 
People in maritime states throughout history, beginning from ancient Athens (see 
Kyriazis and Economou 2013), seem to have understood that their direct or indirect 
participation in this effort brought advantages (although of course in different 
degrees) to everyone involved, and thus they were willing to support this effort. 
              The paper is organised as follows: In the next section, we present the case of 
England and the UP having relatively weaker central governments. Then, we go on to 
examine the institutional and organisational framework for privateering. This is 
followed by the analysis of war against Spain-Portugal in the late 16
th 




 centuries and its economic effects on the belligerents, followed by our 
conclusions. 
WEAK CENTRAL GOVERNANCE: ENGLAND AND THE UNITED 
PROVINCES  
 
By the end of the 15
th
 century, England had lost the Hundred Years War against 
France, and had gone through the Civil War of the Roses that culminated in the 
establishment of a new dynasty, the Tudors after the victory of Henry VII at Bosworth 
in 1485. Henry VII and his heirs, Henry VIII, and his daughters Mary and Elisabeth, 
were thus a new dynasty and had to take into account the interests of the survivors of 
the old nobility, but also the commercial interests of cities, new “low” nobility of the 
country etc.            
 They had to do so even more due to threats to their dynastic claims by other 
contestants (like queen Mary of Scotland) and religious cleavages. Also, England had 
a long tradition of insurrection that limited central power, most notably the 
insurrection of the nobles against King John that forced him to grant the Magna Carta 
in 1215 which can be seen as the first constitution of a modern European state (if we 
accept that some ancient states like Athens and Rome had some kind of constitution, 
called “politeia”). 
 Also, the gradual rise of parliament since at least 1215, was another pivotal 
element to counterbalance the English kings absolutism in imposing their will in 
issues such as arbitrary taxation (see North and Weingast 1989) raising war 
campaigns without the nation’s consent, or offering special privileges in a specific 
groups of the nobility (see, Weir 2001;  O΄Brien 2012). A series of manifestos such as 
the Magna Carta and the simultaneous rise of the English parliament could be seen as 
a way of a relative monitoring against royal absolutism, or as the gradual rise of a 
“checks and balances” system, if we interpret those events through the Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962) spectacles.           
 We have to acknowledge however, that some scholars like Wallerstein (1974) 
argue that the UP were a state with “strong” central governance, extensive 
bureaucracy and large mercenary army, with England being the second and France the 
third In such a classification. He nominates these three cases as a “core”.   
  What we actually want to show is that if Wallenstein’s argument is correct, it 
may lead to some misunderstanding. We will be arguing that England and the UP 
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started from a relatively weaker economic condition, and certainly without the means 
and resources of world empires such as Spain and Portugal, (which benefited from 
silver and gold inflows from the New World, the monopoly of the spices trade etc.) 
combined with weaker central governments.     
Far from denying his methodology or not which it may be based on the eye of 
the beholder, one primary reason that this argumentation is might be scanty is the fact 
that Wallerstein dines Spain and Portugal as parts of what he calls core, although there 
is an extended bibliography arguing that Spain and Portugal were far more centralized 
states than the three cases mentioned above. 
 For example, in contrast to the English policymakers who at least since the 
Elisabethan era promoted a decentralized way of promoting overseas commerce by 
the private sector, (see among others Stone 1972; Davis 1973a, 41; De Vries and van 
der Woude 1997) Cameron (1993 127) argues that any kind of the Spanish and 
Portuguese commercial activity was a part of a monopoly planning being undertaken 
by the state.           
 Wallerstein’s argumentation concerning England is questioned also by Mooers 
(1991), while Warwick (1990, 83) argues that England had not a strong central 
government but a strong navy, while Weingast (1995) by analyzing English political 
institutions before and after the English civil war (1642-51) argues that England could 
characterized even as a “commonwealth” mainly because i) there was a distinctive 
relationship of governance between regional and national level ii) because the state 
had a limited capability and will to impose its policies to the periphery. Weingast calls 
this regional autonomy in local-regional level of English regions as ‘limited 
government”, which it appears to be regarded as one of today’s main prerequisites to 
proclaim a state as of a federal type.  
Another indication of the relative weakness of the central state in England, is the 
fact that according to contemporary claims (Palliser 1983, 12) England was the least 
heavily imposed and least indebted country in Europe, where according to one 
estimate total revenue of the public sector reached less than 5% of GDP (Goldsmith 
1987 19). For example, queen Elisabeth had two important sources of revenue within 
her power, crown lands and customs, while she depended on Parliament for the 
“tenth” and “fifteenth” assessed every three years on laity and clergy and “subsidies”, 
granted under extraordinary conditions, mainly war. 
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Even more, no strong central authority existed in the United Provinces (Dutch 
Republic), which, up to 1568 were geographically part of the Spanish Netherlands and 
had revolted against them from a mix of political, national, commercial and religious 
causes. Although the UP were formally recognized as an independent nation only at 
the treaties of Westphalia and Muenster of 1648, the majority of the land was already 
independent of Spanish rule by the end of the 16
th
 century.  
The Dutch Republic was formed by seven United Provinces, in which again 58 
cities predominated, with Amsterdam being the most important one. The main 
centralised coordinating body was the “States General” with representatives of the 
seven provinces, where each province had one vote and where unanimity was required 
for taking a decision binding on each of them (Davids and t’ Hart 2012). There was 
also the office of the “stadholder”, more or less a head of government of each 
province, who had again a representative and coordinating function, an office that was 
left vacant for substantial periods of time, for example during 1650-1672. 
Another federal institution was the Council of State, a committee of 25 persons 
in which the provinces and the stadholder were represented and which were entrusted 
with military, financial and other business, eg. an executive power. The fleet lay under 
the control of the States General and the “admiral-general”, but the daily direction of 
naval affairs was referred to the five Admiralty Colleges. 
The political system of the UP can be thus called “a democratic head on an 
oligarchic body”, the head being the States General (where each province had a veto 
right due to the unanimity rule) that were elected and the body the 58 semi-
independent cities, which were ruled by the regents (“Regenten”) commercial 
oligarchy. It was a decentralised system where the provinces and the cities and in 
them the commercial interests, had the stronger position.
1
 
Having shown the relatively weaker position of the central authority in England 
and the UP, we turn to the challenge faced by the two states and their market-oriented 
solutions. Due to an “external shock”, the spanish invasion, both countries had to 
develop market solutions, both for trade (the private joint-stock companies that 
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 For a detailed analysis of the UP political and economic system, see (de Vries and van der Woude 
1997; t’ Hart 1996; Halkos and Kyriazis 2005; Kyriazis 2006; Davids and t’ Hart 2012) and the 
additional references provided there. For the Dutch War of Independence, see Parker (1977). For the 
“War of the Roses” history, see Kendall (1973) and Gillingham (1981). 
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developed into the state granted monopolies of the East India Companies, such as the 
East Indian Company [EIC] and the Dutch East Indian Company [VOC]) and war (the 
joint-stock companies for privateering). Because these solutions were proved to be 
superior, England and the UP developed by the beginning of the 17
th
 century into 
economically strong states. 
              Our main thesis is thus, that a state may be strong due to its market oriented 
economy and institutions, even if (or, as a stronger argument, because of) it has a 
relatively weak central government. Relatively weaker governments leave a greater 
space for market oriented solutions, and this fosters economic strength and growth. In 
opposition to relatively weak central governments, in states with strong central 
powers like Spain and Portugal and the great contemporary eastern empires, the 
Ottoman, Mughal India and the Ming China, the central power decides, coordinates 
and retains most of the profits or rents (in the form of taxes, custom duties etc.).                                         
               In Spain for example, the state itself organised most expeditions to the New 
World (like Colombus' expeditions to whom news and ships were provided by Queen 
Isabella and King Ferdinand) and exploited the new lands discovered. The same was 
true for Portugal half a century earlier, where prince Henrique (Henry) the Navigator 
organised the voyages of exploration and discoveries on behalf of the state. (Verge- 
Franceschi 1998). This is of course not to deny that commercial interests existed both 
in Spain and Portugal, but they were subordinated to the government. An indication of 
this is that no joint-stock companies such as the EIC and VOC emerged in Spain and 
Portugal. 
              Further, commercial interests played a minor (or almost non-existent) role in 
shaping policy. If they had a saying, Spanish traders would probably argue that 
Spain's involvement in the Habsburg family German war was a pure waste of 
resources and would probably further argue, that the costly wars against the Ottoman's 
and their North African tributary Barbary states should take a secondary position vis-
a'-vis their New World and Asian trade interests. 
            Further, public private partnerships, to use a modern term, such as those being 





THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ORIENTED SOLUTIONS FOR WAR 
 
By the second half of the 16
th
 century, the Spanish Habsburg Empire of Phillip 
II extended from its American New World colonies, to the Philippines in Asia, and 
included in Europe Spain itself, Portugal (annexed in 1580), the Low Countries, 
Sardinia, Sicily and the Kingdom of Naples, and Franche-Compté in today’s France. 
Phillip II was an ardent Catholic like his father Charles V, and saw himself as the 
protector of the true faith against heretic Protestants, German, Dutch and English 
alike.            
 Religious, economic and political considerations thus made the Spanish empire 
to fight against both England of Elisabeth I and the Dutch rebels of the United 
Provinces under William and then his son Maurice of Nassau-Orange who 
coordinated the Dutch military effort. Phillip sent armies against the rebels in the 
Netherlands and prepared fleets for invading England, which culminated with the 
defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. The Dutch adopted a defensive strategy on 
land, since their own land forces would not be a match in a pitched battle against the 
Spanish “tercio” regiments, the best infantry of the time. Their defence consisted of 
fortresses, coupled with extensive flooding of land areas by opening dams. England 
did not have a land frontier with any Spanish territory and at the time, like the Dutch, 
did not yet possess any overseas colonies. 
The Dutch, being encircled on land by Spanish territories had only one open 
way to the rest of the world, the sea. They used it to expand commercially by the end 
of the century making their first attempt to capture the spices trade, which they did 
successfully complete during the next century. Parallel to this, they attacked the most 
vulnerable points of the Spanish empire, their maritime commerce with their colonies. 
The English tried also during the same time to actively participate, as newcomers, in 
international maritime trade, at first peacefully, but they encountered the hostility of 
Spain in her own territories, which sometimes expelled British traders by the use of 
force, as at San Juan de Ulua in 1568.
2
 The Spanish, wanted to keep a monopoly of 
                                                 
2
 John Hawkins and Francis Drake were at the time merchants who tried to break into the Spanish trade 
monopoly. In September 1568 Hawkins and his five ships was forced to run for shelter into the Spanish 
harbour of San Juan de Ulua. A few days later the Spanish treasure fleet arrived and the Spanish 
assaulted the English ships, and after a six hour battle only two English ships, Hawkins and Drake’s 
escaped (Konstam 2000). 
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trade with their colonies, which was one of the causes (the main economic one) for 
hostilities with England. 
Both the English and the Dutch thus went to war against the Spanish trade and 
colonies. For this, they resorted to privateering, using market organisation forms to 
finance their expeditions. Queen Elizabeth had started a programme of building 
dedicated warships (sailing galleons) of which she had 34 in 1588 to face Armada 
campaign, 13 of which were over 500 tons. This represented 18% of the total English 
fleet of 197 ships. Of them, 18 were build after 1581 and only three before 1570 
(Tincey 1988). To these must be added 14 ships build before 1564 (Rodger 1997). 
This meant that when undeclared hostilities started in earnest by the beginning of the 
1570’s, there were practically no dedicated warships to carry the war against the 
Spanish. 
During the same period, the Dutch revolt had just started and there were none as 
yet dedicated Dutch warships. On the other hand, the distinction between dedicated 
warships and armed merchantmen had just started to emerge. Most navies, the 
Spanish-Portuguese included (which also comprised some dedicated warships) made 
up their numbers by using merchantmen. Almost all merchantmen were armed, and 
by being up-gunned (with the addition of more guns) and up-crewed (with the 
addition of more crew members to serve the guns and in the Spanish navy with 




Thus, the English and the Dutch could solve relatively easy the first part of the 
challenge, the availability of ships. The solution to the second part was less obvious: 
Who and how would organise and finance the war operations against the Spanish? In 
the UP, were the revolt had just started, these were as yet not even a rudimentary 
central federal authority to do it. England, as stated above, had some royal ships, but 
retained them for home defence, as a fleet in being. Even more serious, the English 
crown did not have adequate finances for overseas expeditions.    
  Queen Mary, Elizabeth’s sister and predecessor, inherited from her father 
                                                 
3
 The Dutch were so successful against the Spanish with this practice that they discovered quite late 
and to their detriment the necessity of dedicated warships. This happened after their defeat during the 
first Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-1654 by the English dedicated warships, which forced them to build 
their own (see Tincey 1988; Rodger 2004 and Davids and t’ Hart 2012). 
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Henry VIII an empty treasury and a heavy foreign debt (owed to foreign bankers). She 
managed her affairs with great prudence, a pattern followed by Elizabeth after she 
became Queen in 1558. During 1565-1574 she spent on average just £16.000 per year 
on her Navy (6,5% of total income). But she had spent £ 246.380 on the fruitless 
Havre expedition (or about a year’s total revenue) and she also had a considerable 
foreign debt (Rodger 1997). Elizabeth out of prudence (learning of the risks and costs 
of overseas expeditions like Havre’s) and necessity could not finance herself costly 
overseas expeditions against Spanish commerce and New World colonies, out of state 
revenues. In both the English and the Dutch case, market solutions were found: the 
use of privateers-corsairs for a war for a private at first and public as a second way of 
making profit.           
 During the 16
th
 century merchants in the UP and England stared developing a 
new form of organisation, joint-stock companies, which in the UP were called 
“partenrederij” (partnerships) for maritime trade. Similar forms of organisations were 
created already in prototype forms in ancient and medieval maritime societies, like 
Athens, Rhodes, Rome, Venice, Pisa and Genova, leading us to assert that similar 
problems lead to similar solutions over the ages. The Italian experience may have 
influenced England and the UP, as did Venetian banking influence to the UP banking, 
the Bank of Amsterdam being modelled for example on the Venetian bank de la 
Piazza di Rialto. In England, the oldest joint-stock company were the Guinea 
Adventures, established in 1553 for trade with West Africa, followed in 1555 by the 
Muscovy company for trade with the then Duchy of Moscow.  
Joint-stock companies were the best solutions to solve the cooperation and 
coordination problem involved in long distance trade and fishing, as for example the 
firms, timber and cereal trade with Muscovy, the hearing trade in the Atlantic and 
above all, the spices trade. In the absence of a government imposed solution, 
merchants had to discover, probably through a process of trial and error, market 
solutions.  
Joint-stock companies emerged as the best one to solve the problem of acquiring 
sufficient capital and making clear the leadership and distribution of profits (or losses) 
issues. Overseas trade required substantial capital and joint-stock companies 
permitted the pooling of resources and at the same time, reduction of risk to 
individuals, who would loose only the capital of their shares in joint-stock companies. 
Overseas trade required intensive coordination and cooperation by participants, and 
 11 
joint-stock companies were the best suited coordination and cooperation mechanism 
for this task. 
There exists substantial and growing literature on coordination and cooperation 
mechanisms, mainly in the fields of organisation and game theory. (Malone and 
Crowson 1994; Adler 2001; Kale, Dyer and Singh 2002; Xu and Beamon 2006 and 
Fink and Kessler 2010). 
 As far as we know, we apply for the first time an analysis of joint stock 
companies both for trade and privateering, as coordination and cooperation 
mechanisms.  Coordination and cooperation mechanisms create a particular way to 
find solutions to specific problems based on shared information and a set of 
behavioural rules in the form of organisations by acting according to specified and 
normalised rules. Joint-stock companies evolved through contracts between the 
stockholders of the company, and the company and the ships, officers and crews 
(officers and even sailors were sometimes at the same time, stockholders). 
 The most important consequence of cooperation and coordination mechanisms 
is that they diminish transaction costs and enhance efficiency. In situations of risk, as 
the long range trading enterprises, and even more, privateering, cues are evolved and 
take sometimes even the form of a specific language, that helps lower transaction 
costs in situations in which the risk that someone takes depends on the performance of 
another actor (Coleman 1990, 91). 
Privateering was a highly risky (but also highly lucrative type of enterprise. 
Ships have always been, as analysed by Kyriazis (2012) for the ancient Athenian 
triremes and Rodger (1997) and Ο΄ Brien (2012) for the Elisabethan England English 
galleons, the supreme type of coordination and cooperation mechanism, requiring the 
cooperation of many types of specialist groups, officers and sailors having to 
undertake different tasks like navigation (position finding), logistics, hygiene, sailing 
and gunnery in order to maximize the probability of surviving in battle and attaining 
victory. With each successful enterprise, the cooperation and coordination was fine-
tuned, and the values created and associated with them, like trust, cohesion, self-
reliance, self-consciousness, obedience to commands and teamwork, were enhanced. 
 But we would go a step further, suggesting that cooperation and coordination 
mechanisms and joint-stock companies for long distance trade and privateering were 
“proto-democratic” institutions. First, because joint-stock companies had meetings of 
stockholders where voting (according to the number of stock owned by each 
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stockholder) was done, as was the case in ancient and direct democracies, eg, ancient 
Greek city-states as well as the post-medieval Swiss cities and cantons. 
 During the late 16
th–beginning of the 17th century, democratic voting, even if 
not on political issues, was a novelty and it helped introduce a new culture in the 
decentralised maritime states. On board privateering ships, another democratic idea 
may have become latent, though not yet explicit the idea of common purpose or 
“common good”, in the sense that all members of the ship’s crew stood to profit from 
the successful achievement of the privateering enterprise. 
 This common purpose or good was both personal profit and patriotism, even 
religious fervor against a catholic enemy. This “common good” was near to the ideal 
of “homonoia”, the supreme democratic ideal as advanced already by ancient Greek 
philosophers like Aristotle (“Politics” 1264 a 36-37). 
 We even suggest that the creation of this specific set of values and norms as the 
outcome of the particular type of cooperation and coordination mechanism 
represented by joint-stock companies and their ships, helped into the creation of the 
preconditions that made England and the UP the most democratic states (together with 
Switzerland) in the 17
th
 century, an inquiry we pursue to answer concerning also the 
cases of both the Achaean Greek proto-federation of the fourth century BC and the 
United Provinces, through an interactive comparative analysis (Kyriazis and 
Economou, under review). 
  The joint-stock organisation form was adapted from the trade sector to the 
military one, when the necessity arose to combat the Spanish and Portuguese. Instead 
of searching for a new solution, the adaptation of a proven one was preferred, because 
these led to a reduction of transaction costs. A totally new solution would require 
higher transaction costs, for information gathering, drafting of new types of contracts 
etc.
4
 Thus, when the necessity arose, both English and Dutch created joint-stock 
                                                 
4
 The interpretation we offer here concerning both English and Dutch privateering activities is an 
extension of Simon's (1982, 1991) “bounded rationality”, which states that the human mind has 
limitations, for example in its capacity to absorb and use new information. In real life, instead of 
searching for an “absolute ideal” (as for example, utility maximisation according to microeconomic 
theory) we try to reach a solution that satisfies us, even if it is not the best possible one. Simon calls 
this behaviour “satisfycing”. This enables us to find acceptable solutions with minimal expenditure of 
time and effort, thus reducing transaction costs. Satisfycing behaviour diffuses known solutions and 
problem-solving rules to new problems, since this reduces again time and effort. Thus, a tried 
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companies for privateering, where participants (in England from queen Elisabeth 
herself, to merchants and down to even simple sailors and “citizens”) took specific 
shares of stock in the company according to their capital invested which entitled them 
to a similar percentage of prospective profits.       
 A strong element on which joint-stock companies were bases, apart from their 
founding charts, was trust. The relevant modern literature emphasizes trust as being 
important for the smooth functioning of an transaction cost reducing mechanism. 
Trust has been recognised as a lubricant enabling organisations and societies to 
achieve Pareto superior outcomes (Arrow 1974; Fukuyama 1995; Kramer 1999). 
Trust among members who formed partnerships for trade, was a basic element for 
them to form partnerships (in the form mainly of joint-stock companies) for war. This 
was made easier since in many cases the merchants participating in privateering 
enterprises were the same with those participating in peaceful trade.    
 But even before the establishment of the companies, an amount of trust must 
have existed (through personal ties of knowledge and information sharing) between 
the original members of the joint-stock companies to be created. This trust is the most 
important element that evolves, it is strengthened and permits the smooth functioning 
of organisations as efficient cooperation and coordination mechanisms. For example, 
the Englishmen John Hawkins, Martin Frobisher, Francis Drake and many others, 
started as traders, then, becoming successful corsairs and then some were knighted 
and served as captains in the war against Spain in 1588 and after.   
   Trust between captains, officers and men was a very important element for 
running a ship efficiently, both in trade and war. Ships, either merchantmen or 
warships, are another example of cooperation and coordination mechanism. It requires 
intensive cooperation and coordination among the captain, the officers, the sailors 
doing different tasks, like setting the sails, controlling steering, making the guns etc. 
Building experience through repeated voyages aboard the ships both enhances 
coordination and cooperation, builds trust and thus, increases efficiency. This again is 
a validation of the well-known dictum that it took a few years to build a ship, but 
                                                                                                                                            
organisational solution, the joint-stock company, is transferred to a new problem, that of organising 
privateering expeditions. 
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decades to build and upkeep a naval tradition (Palliser 1983).
5
    
  Privateers and corsairs
6
 were distinguished from outlaw pirates, since they were 
empowered by their governments to wage war against their enemies, but not against 
neutral states and their own ships. They received a “letter of marque” or “reprisal” 
stating this, and thus acted in a general sense on behalf of their government (see 
Rodger 1997). What distinguished them from the official government and state owned 
ships was the organisation and financing of their expeditions and their latitude in 
pursuing their aims.            
 As to the second, individual captains, or leaders of expeditions in cases where 
more than one ship participated (more and more common by the end of the 16
th
 and 
beginning of the 17
th
 century) were totally free to choose the region of their operations 
and the way they would operate, as well as the time they would devote to their 
operations.  They waged an individual, decentralised type of war, which as we will 
show later on, proved to be extremely efficient.  
 
THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF PRIVATEEING 
 
The Dutch Sea Beggars 
In the early days of the Dutch Revolt warfare was dominated by the actions of a 
bunch of unruly privateers, called “beggars” in contempt by the Spanish, a name 
which they proudly took over as “Watergeuzen” (Sea Beggars). Indeed the Sea 
Beggars liberated the first Netherlands territory from the Spanish, capturing in a 
surprise attack the port of Brill in 1572. This was followed rapidly by a number of 
other ports, Flushing and Veere (in Zeeland), Enkhuizen (in North Holland) and later 
by major cities like Amsterdam. Thus, the UP acquired the necessary ports for their 
trade expansion, which served also as privateering bases (Parker 1977; Israel 1995). 
                                                 
5 Kyriazis (2012, 30-39) analyses the ancient Greek warship, the “trireme” and fleets, as cooperation 
and coordination mechanisms, the values that arose out of these, and its political repercussions. 
6
 Privateers and corsairs are synonymous, the first term coming from “private” denoting ownership of 
the ship by the captain or the company (as against English royal ships owned by the state-queen). 
Corsair comes from the French “course” meaning booty. As we show, in some cases piracy and 




During the first two decades of the revolt, the port-cities authorities were 
somewhat reluctant to grant corsairs licences, because some privateers attacked and 
plundered neutral ships, thus endangering the diplomatic efforts of the States General 
that worked for the recognition of Dutch independence by other states. But in 1598 
King Philip of Spain issued an official embargo against the Dutch, forcing the States 
General to react: All goods and possessions of Spain were legitimate prizes of 
privateers. In order to limit “outlaw behaviour” by privateers the States General 
demanded a caution of money of 6.000 guilders, later raised to 20.000, which was 
forfeited in case of misbehaviour of the captain, eg. if he attacked neutral ships (van 
Loo 1998).            
 Showing remarkable flexibility and a very early case of investment cross border 
mobility according to the institutional advantages and disadvantages offered by each 
location, many Dutch privateers turned their back on Holland after 1604, when the 
States General raised the bail and made conditions for obtaining privateer licences 
more difficult, some becoming pirates, but more often, the merchants joint-stock 
companies financing (mainly from Zeeland) and contracting French captains (some 
from Dunkirk) like the famous ones, Nicholas Jarry and Pierre le Turcq. Amsterdam 
merchants soon followed the example of the Zeeland merchants, financing Dunkirk 
privateers. Well-to-do merchants from Middleburg (in Zeeland) engaged in the 
privateering business right up to the end of the 18
th
 century. Another Zeeland port 
Flushing (Vlissingen) grew into one of the most feared privateering ports of the time 
(Davids and t’ Hart 2012). 
We have within the various cities of the early UP an early manifestation of 
intercity competition that led in the course of time to some maritime specialisation: 
Amsterdam developed into the most important trading and entrepôt city and thus was 
less interested over time into privateering business. Some Zeeland ports, like Flushing 
and Middleburg, which were economically hit by the downfall of neighbouring 
Antwerp (due to a large part to Dutch sea blockade) specialised into the alternative 
maritime business form of privateering. But even Amsterdam invested heavily into 
privateering in an indirect form through the prototype joint-stock companies, the 
Dutch East India Company (VOC) established in 1602 and the West Indian one. 
Amsterdam financial interests were predominant in both (Kyriazis and Metaxas 
2011).             
 The VOC played an important role by undertaking large-scale privateering 
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activities against Spanish and Portuguese ships and colonies in Asia (Gaastra 2003). 
The West Indian Company (WIC) was even more successful in its privateering 
expeditions, its biggest success coming in 1628, when a company fleet commanded 
by Piet Heyn managed to capture one Spanish “plata” (silver) fleet off Matanzas in 
Cuba. It was the only time in history that an entire Spanish treasure fleet was 
captured.             
 This not only financed the WIC’s successful conquests in Brazil, but also 
destroyed in one blow about a third of the ships employed in Seville’s (Spain’s main 
port with the New World) Atlantic trade. Between 1623 and 1626 the WIC took or 
destroyed 547 ships worth about 5,5 Mio guilders (Cooper 1970 226-238). This sum 
was greater than the WIC’s total, own capital. The WIC capital was 7 mio guilders, 
and the value of the silver captured in 1628 was more than 10 mio guilders 
(Goldsmith 1983 214, 305). 
Within the Dutch-Spanish conflict, the Dutch were also fighting against the 
Portuguese, since Portugal had been incorporated since 1580 in the Spanish empire, 
and remained part of it till 1640 (the Portuguese squadron of the Spanish Armada of 
1588 was one of the best and of 12 galleons with 387 guns and 3649 crew, see 
Konstam 2001). Portuguese ships and colonies suffered substantially from Dutch 
attacks, both in American waters, (outside Brazil) Africa (outside Angola) and Asia. 
In particular, the Dutch thought that these Portuguese colonies were weak links in the 
Spanish–Portuguese empire and, using seapower, they extended their operations 
ashore, attacking Portuguese strongholds. In 1624-25 they took and then lost Bahia, in 
1630 they began the conquest of Permambuco (NE. Brazil) which was completed by 
John Maurice in 1637, in 1638 they captured Elucina in Guinea (Africa) and started 
the conquest of coastal Ceylon, in 1640 they defeated a Portuguese armada of 
Pernambuco and in 1641 they captured Malacca (in SE. Asia, today’s Malacca 
Straits), the Mercahao and Luanda.         
 They concluded a Ten Year Trace with the Portuguese in June 1641. Hostilities 
resumed nevertheless in 1644-5 with a rebellion against the Dutch in NE Brazil, while 
the Portuguese recaptured Luanda and Benguela in 1648, and by 1654 the Portuguese 
expelled definitely the Dutch from Brazil. On the other hand, the Dutch completed 
during 1654-1658 the conquest of Coastal Ceylon and Malabar from the Portuguese. 
Peace was signed with the now independent (since 1640) Portugal, which left the 
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Dutch dominant in Indian Ocean waters and Asia where the Portuguese retained only 
a few bases like in the Indian peninsula and Macao in the Chinese coast (Boxer 1965). 
The Dutch–Portuguese conflict was costly for both sides and most of capital of 
the Dutch West India Company was lost in the Brazilian war, which explains in part 
why the WIC was less durable and successful than the VOC. On the other hand, the 
war was even more costly for Portugal, which although it did regain Brazil, it lost 
most of its Asian colonies, and even more important, the lucrative spices trade. 




The English Sea Dogs 
Already by 1563 Elizabeth granted the first “letters of reprisal”. The corsairs’ 
enterprises linked trade, war and privateering and in some cases like with the Dutch, 
piracy, with the religious feeling of “holy” war of the Protestants against the Catholic 
League of Phillip II linking patriotism and economic gains. Similarly with the Dutch, 
and more or less for the same reason, the organisation form of joint-stock companies, 
called “syndicate of investors” were chosen. These syndicates were open for 
participation to merchant-bankers, nobles, the captains and the sailors of the ships, but 
even members of government. In the financing of Drake’s expedition of 1577 
participated along the usual merchant and banking circles, Sir Francis Walsingham, 
the Secretary of State, and Queen Elizabeth herself (Bradford 1965). 
The gains were distributed according to everyone’s share in the enterprise, with 
the Lords of the Admiralty (e.g. the “Ministry of the Navy” of the time) receiving 
10% of the sales at auctions of the seized enemy property. This can be interpreted in 
modern terms as a kind of sales tax, linked to the fact that the Admiralty granted the 
licences to the privateers (Andrews 1964; Rodger 1997; Konstam 2000; Kyriazis and 
Zouboulakis 2003). 
As suggested in Kyriazis and Metaxas (2011), the first successful expeditions 
initiated a continuous game, along which the enterprises became more elaborate, 
ambitious and bigger. Along each further step of the game, the decision makers 
gained every kind of new knowledge, financial, organisational, operational and 
technical. 
After the successful repulse of the Spanish Armada in 1588, Elizabeth and the 
Lords of the Admiralty felt that since the danger of invasion was less acute, they 
could also use royal warships in privateering expeditions (Konstan 2001). So, in some 
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of the expeditions of the 1590s, Elizabeth contributed both funds and “means in kind”, 
e.g. royal warships. For the 1596 expedition against Puerto Rico, she contributed 
33.266 pounds and some royal ships to the total of the 26 ships. Commonly, guns 
from royal ships, as well as cords, ropes etc. were used to furnish the “private” 
privateering ships. We can interpret, in modern terms, this organisational development 
as one of the first historical cases of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), which was a 
case of acquiring and deepening new organisational and institutional knowledge. 
Technical knowledge went also hand in hand with organisational one. Since the 
privateering enterprises were driven by market and profitability considerations, we 
should expect that cost and efficiency aspects were given particular attention. When 
“businessmen” undertook the privateering operations under the profit motive, they 
made their ex-ante calculations with this aim, much more so than say Spanish 
“bureaucrats” who were administering and appropriating state funds. This actually 
happened in England. We analyse two technical aspects to illustrate this. 
Till the middle of the 16
th
 century, most guns were made of bronze, which 
offered many advantages compared to iron guns.
7
 But for the English, and for 
privateering in particular, iron guns offered a decisive advantage, that of cost. Iron 
abounded in the country and iron guns cost one tenth of the price of bronze guns. 
During the period under consideration, a period of increasing inflation in Europe and 
in England, the price of cast iron guns actually fell from 10-12 pounds per ton in 
1565-1570 to 8-9 pounds in 1600 (Davies 1963). As expected, privateering ships (and 
royal ships as well) were increasingly supplied by iron guns. This again led to a great 
impetus to the iron industry in England. Thus, cost considerations linked with the 
profitability motive of the privateering expeditions led to long lasting economic 
effects (Kyriazis and Zouboulakis 2003). 
Privateering ships were, also due to cost considerations, relatively small, 
compared to their prey, the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic and Asian galleons. 
Drake’s “Golden Hind” for example had a displacement of 120 tons and was armed 
with 18 iron guns (Bradford 1965) compared to 700 and up to 1.200 tons of the 
                                                 
7
 Iron melts at a much higher level of temperature that bronze, making it thus much more difficult to 
achieve high quality without shortcomings. It weighs about 20% more than bronze and becomes 
corrugated by gun-powder. A bronze gun that received an overdose of powder discharge dilates and 
cracks, but an iron gun under the same circumstances just explodes without further warning. Thus, iron 
guns were more dangerous to their crews (see Rodger, 1997). 
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enemies galleons and “naos”.8 In order to be able to defeat their enemies in battle, the 
small English privateering ships had to develop a technical advantage: They were 
better sailing ships, but also, they achieved a much higher rate of fire.   
 This again was due to their development of a new gun carriage (four short 
wheels against two big ones as in land guns in most Spanish ships) and tackle system, 
which permitted a faster reloading of guns. According to some estimates, the English 
could fire a shot every two minutes, while the Spanish needed usually double that 
time. The new gun carriage-tackle system was first introduced in the “Mary Rose” of 
1545 but it was generalised by the 1560s in all privateering ships and parallel to them, 
in the royal ships. It is clear, that the new innovation was efficiency enhancing. 
We now turn to a brief summary of privateers operations and their economic 
effects. Most famous amongst them was Drake’s expedition of 1577 which would 
result in the second, after Magellan’s, circumnavigation of the world. Drake started 
the expedition with five ships and 164 men, but finished only with his own “Golden 
Hind” (Bradford 1965 101). In the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Peru he captured the 
Spanish galleon “Nuestra Seňora de la Conception” loaded with 26 tons of silver from 
the silver mines of Potosi. At the Molucas islands in the Pacific he added a second 
ship carrying spice before returning to Plymouth in 1580. The value of his plunder 
was the astronomical sum of 600.000 pounds, double the annual English crown 
revenue. His investors had a rate of return of 4.700%, which makes it probably the 
best single investment in history. 
During the last two decades of the 16
th
 century, the cargoes of Spanish ships 
seized by privateers were valued at 100-200.000 pounds per year, representing about 
15% of total English imports. During the period 1588, they seized over 1.000 ships 
and organised a total of 150 expeditions against the Spanish towns and settlements in 
the New World, leading to the conquest and plunder of many of them, such as Puerto 
de Caballos in Mexico (plundered 6 times) Porto Bello in Panama, even the strategic 
bay of Cadiz in Spain in 1587 and 1596. Their success was such that the prices of 
                                                 
8
 The “nao” was a Portuguese big merchant sailing ship (the word originating probably from the Greek 
“ναυς” meaning ship). Konstam (2001) gives a list of the Spanish-Portuguese Armada ships, many of 
which were armed merchantmen. Among them the naos “Santa Anna” and the “La Regazona” both 
displaced 1200 tons, while among the typical merchantmen supply ships, we find “El Gran Grifon” and 
“San Salvador” of 650 tons and “El Castilo Negro” of 750. 
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colonial goods of the Spanish empire were often lower in the London than in the 
Seville market! (Andrews 1984; Rodger 1997)  
The importance of privateering for England is illustrated also by the fact that the 
amount of coinage during Elizabeth’s reign is given as £ 5,4 mio, out of which £ 4,6 
mio were silver coinage. According to Goldsmith (1983 180) “Most apparently came 
from Spanish America, partly as the result of naval privateering operations”. Craig 
(1953 127) estimated the amount of silver captured from Spain at £ 1,25 mio, or 27% 
of total silver circulation within English economy.  
The treaty of Muenster of 1648 brought peace and formal recognition of the UP 
by the Spanish crown. Spain managed to retain most of its colonies in America, with 
the loss of only some of them in the Caribbean. But Spain was in decline, and did not 
regain its leading position as the greatest European power during the 16
th
 century. 
During the period from 1557 to 1647 there were six consecutive bankruptcies, which 
brought down with them great financial houses, ruining its financial credibility and 
destroyed in the long-run the development of a stable financial and banking system as 
well as stock exchange in Spain (Cooper 1970; North and Thomas 1973; Kennedy 
1988; North 1990; Rodger 1997).     
In general, both historians and economists agree on the decline of Spain as a 
result of the war with England and the UP. Rodger (1997, chapters 18, 20 and 24) 
describes the results for Spain’s commerce and gives a vivid description of the ruin of 
Spanish shipyards. Older historians already had described this, as Trevor-Roper 
(1970, chapter IX, 263) writing: “The war had now proved long, meaningless and 
disastrous”, Cooper (1970, chapter VIII) writing on a change in the balance of sea-
power and the rise of the Dutch and English naval supremacy, and Spooner (1970, 
chapter II) writing on Spain’s decline and the Northern states rise. Even the title of 
vol. IV of the New Cambridge Modern History is characteristic: “The decline of Spain 
and the Thirty Years War”. Kennedy (1988, chapter II, 41) writes on the conclusion 
of the war “…they revealed that the age of Holsburg ….in Europe was over”.  
As Rodger (1997, 296) remarks: Twenty years of war changed England’s 
perspective. While before the Queen possessed an imposing but almost isolated fleet 
now naval strength had become a national matter. It was clear that England’s future 
laid in the open seas… The English had learned that the sea was more than a defence 
 21 







     Due to the particular historical circumstances pertaining in the second half of 
the 16
th
 century, two relatively poor newcomer states in the international arena, 
England and the UP, both having relatively weaker central authorities than 
contemporary empires (the Spanish, Ottoman, Mughal and Ming) had to find new 
means to face the Spanish challenge. 
They adopted market oriented solutions, to wage war for profit using 
partnership joint-stock companies as an organisation form to mount privateering 
expeditions. It was a decentralised form of war-making, since privateers followed 
their own aims and tactics, not according to a central plan. They could expect 
maximization of profits if they attacked the enemy’s commerce, both ships and 
settlements. In due time this strategy of commerce raiding proved to be the Achilles 
heel of the enemy. As we have sketched above, the privateering-commerce raiding 
activity brought wealth and profits to England and the UP and ruined Spain.  
 Although a more or less privateering strategy implemented by the Late 
Medieval era Italian city-states, such as Venice and Genoa, with the cases of England 
and the UP it was the first time in history that privateering was used in such scale and 
to such effect, (although of course privateering and piracy is almost as old as maritime 
history itself). Thus, it comes as no surprise that this commerce raiding strategy has 
been adopted during the following years as a strategy of the weaker naval opponent 
against the stronger one, with varying successes, as for example by the French against 
the Anglo Dutch during the War of Spanish succession 1702-1713, the Napoleonic 
Wars, and the German submarine warfare against the Allies during the two World 
Wars. 
 Economists of course have very often argued about the superiority of market 
regimes as against state planed ones in terms of economic efficiency and growth. The 
main point of our analysis here is that market solutions can prove to be superior in 
war strategy, even though they came about, as in the cases of England and the UP, by 
                                                 
9
 The last phrase has been attributed to Sir Walter Raleigh, a famous corsair, admiral and poet. 
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chance or by trial and error. It seems that pursuing personal profit, as the privateers 
did, they operated under an “Invisible Hand of the market of war” (to paraphrase the 
well known dictum of Adam Smith) which in the end maximized operational 
efficiency and economic benefits. 
On the other hand, the more centralised Spanish empire had an elaborate policy 
driven by non or mainly non economic motives. Kennedy (1988, 51), for example 
gives as the main policy aims of the Habsburgs religion “protector of Catholic 
Christendom” and “reputation”. The relative strength of the central authority in Spain, 
coupled to centrally laid policy aims led to “acts of economic folly” (ibid, 52) and 
institutional solutions that in the long run were growth inhibiting. North (1981) and 
Kennedy (1988) give many examples of bad institutional choices taken by the Spanish 
empire, as for example the taxation of the “mesta” guild (wool producer of Spain) that 
inhibited the enclosure movement in Spain and thus long run efficiency in agriculture. 
Phillip II of Spain for example used his considerable wealth to wage war at the 
same time against the Ottomans in the Mediterranean, the revolted Dutch, the English 
and the German Protestants. His resources were not sufficient for all these operations. 
Further, he neglected one of his empires crucial regions, the New World possessions 
and his lines of communications. Were he to operate under more market oriented 
considerations, his policy priorities would have been to strengthen the defences of his 
New World territories and of his sea communications, instead of wasting money 
fighting the Protestant German princes and the Dutch. 
Moreover, the privateering war against Spain fostered new norms and values, 
which were market oriented and not imposed by a central authority, like self-
confidence, self-reliance, trust, a “sense of destiny” and the profit motive. This was 
the basis for searching and finding new institutional solutions to a new formidable 
challenge, that of Spain’s threat to the independence and the economic interests of 
England and the UP. The answer were market based institutions and organisations, 
like partnerships and joint-stock companies both for trade and for war, and later a 
whole interdependent complex of financial institutions, banks, insurance and stock 
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